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MINNESOTA REFLECTIONS ON A CENTURY OF CHANGE
AND STASIS: ROSCOE POUND'S VISIT TO ST. PAUL
AN INTRODUCTION AND ESSAY
Jon M. Garon'
"The law is the highest inheritance the sovereign
people has, for without the law there would be no
sovereign people and no inheritance. 2
One hundred years ago, at the Minnesota Capitol in St. Paul, the
young Roscoe Pound addressed The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice before the annual convention of the American
Bar Association.3 He summarized that speech by saying:
With law schools that are rivaling the achievements
of Bologna and of Bourges to promote scientific study of the
law; with active Bar Associations in every state to revive
professional feeling and throw off the yoke of
commercialism; with the passing of the doctrine that politics,
too, is a mere game to be played for its own sake, we may
look forward confidently to deliverance from the sporting
theory of justice; we may look forward to a near future when
our courts will be swift and certain agents of justice, whose
decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all.4
A century has passed since Pound leveled his criticism at the legal
profession and held out this branch for hope. Through our institutes of legal
education, our professional associations and the judiciary, he called for a
change to swift and certain justice. Like Luther, Pound nailed his complaints
to the door of the ABA, and the ABA listened. Through his simple
statement, Pound has arguably transformed justice in America. Pound went
on to become dean of Harvard Law School and a seminal voice in the growth
of law as a profession in America.
I Dean and Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. J.D.
Columbia 1988. I would like to thank the many deans and faculty members who have
commented on the proposal.
2 The Work of Justice, TIME, May 5, 1958, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,863304-1,00.html (quoting Roscoe Pound,
1958 Law Day U.S.A.).
3 Roscoe Pound, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, Address Before the American Bar
Association (Aug. 1906), in 35 F.R.D. 273 (June 1964).
4 Id. at 291.
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In this symposium issue of the Hamline Law Review and the live
symposium A Century Later: Answering Roscoe Pounds Call for Change in
the Administration of Justice, held at Hamline University School of Law
April 13, 2007, scholars from Hamline and throughout the country have an
opportunity to take another look at how far we have come since that moment
and how far we still have to go.
Throughout this symposium issue many of the structural problems of
the legal system will be addressed. Student articles on the ethical imperative
to improve the profession's responsiveness to our clients' inquiries5 and
changes to professional marketing and advertising 6 highlight both what has
changed and what has not. Of course, formal advertising did not exist a
century ago, but undoubtedly the informal pecking order was reinforced
through the techniques of the day. Through social clubs and a more stratified
societal structure, the "Super Lawyers" of the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries were promoted, and the concerns of fairness and transparency were
as rampant as they are today. I am impressed by Susan Stephan's Blowing
the Whistle on Justice as Sport: 100 Years of Playing a Non-Zero Sum
Game, which applies sophisticated law and economics analysis to problems
identified by Pound well before economics had been suborned to serve the
law's academic needs. 7 Perhaps even more important are the reflections of
Dean Daisy Hurst Floyd in Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the
Development of Professional Identity on the implications that Pound's
address should have on legal education itself.
8
The April 13, 2007 symposium and this symposium issue of
Hamline Law Review are most noteworthy for the diversity of ideas they
explore.9 The breadth highlights the broad canvas on which Roscoe Pound
painted his vision of a more perfect profession.
I am honored to add my voice to the authors represented in this
journal issue, and I have chosen to focus my opening essay on four concerns
raised by Pound on the environment of our judicial administration. In many
respects, this series of criticisms could have been presented at any ABA
convention in the past century, and the truth of the complaints would have
remained self-evident at any time. Nonetheless, despite the lack of change
on these topics, the concerns demand ongoing attention.
Pound's first criticism was the "[p]opular lack of interest in justice,
which makes jury service a bore and the vindication of right and law
5 Stephen E. Schemenauer, What We Have Here ... is a Failure ... to
Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation's Most Common Ethical Complaint, 30
HAMLINE L. REV. 629 (2007).
6 Joshua A. Dorothy, Impervious to Kryptonite: Why Minnesota's "Super
Lawyers " Can Continue Advertising, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 683 (2007).
7 Susan Hayes Stephan, Blowing the Whistle on Justice as Sport: 100 Years of
Playing a Non-Zero Sum Game, 30 HAMUNE L. REv. 587 (2007).
8 Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of
Professional Identity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555 (2007).
9 See supra notes 5-8 and infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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secondary to the trouble and expense involved."' 0 Pound further noted that
"the average press reports distract attention from the real proceeding to petty
tilts of counsel, encounters with witnesses and sensational by-incidents."' I
Today, the lack of popular interest in justice could be reversed from
the prior century - if we can accept that Court TV, Judge Judy, and former
judges serving as shock-hosts on CNN, Fox and other cable television
networks inform the public in a meaningful and representative manner.
Public interest in attack journalism, of course, is not the same as public
interest in justice, since an understanding of justice requires context,
contemplation, and shared values. Instead, the media sensationalize the
issues, ignore the detail essential to effective administration, and profit on
human suffering to sell advertising time.
Pound described this part of the problem as "public ignorance of the
real workings of courts due to ignorant and sensational reports in the
press." ' 2  A century later, we are probably just one click away from
"YouTube Court," where civil disputes will be heard over the Internet, a
public jury will blog its deliberations, and the outcome will be determined by
a twelve-minute instant poll. With downloadable filings, pop-up evidence
windows, and instant-message cross examination, some blog-pundits might
even suggest that this will enhance the delivery of justice because it increases
visibility of court activities.
This version of engagement is not what Pound identified as our need
in society. Instead we need to make participation in the judicial process (as
well as the electoral process) a core obligation of our nation's citizens, rather
than a chore to be avoided. We need to inform the public regarding the true
nature of the judicial controversies, not merely the salacious facts that
increase viewership and web hits.
Second, Pound lamented "the strain put upon law in that it has today
to do the work of morals also."'13 Pound's emphasis is on the transition from
a society rigidly bound by notions of hidebound religious doctrine to one
struggling without a common core value.
Law is the skeleton of social order. It must be "clothed upon
by the flesh and blood of morality." The present is a time of
transition in the very foundations of belief and of conduct.
Absolute theories of morals and supernatural sanctions have
lost their hold. Conscience and individual responsibility are
relaxed. In other words, the law is strained to do double
duty, and more is expected of it than in a time when morals
as a regulating agency are more efficacious.'
4
10 Pound, supra note 3, at 290.
II Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
2007]
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Again, the description could be applied to the twenty-first century.
The law cannot be expected to replace morality. Controversies surrounding
issues such as gay marriage can be reflected in law but they should not be
debated there or legislated there. 15 Not only would Pound have decried the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision declaring same-sex marriage
constitutionally protected, but he would have also objected to unenforceable
legislative bans on such relationships. 16  The Law - particularly the
procedural rules of the game - should not be used to distort the public
debate. Instead the moral center must be established by consensus after
robust, but respectful discourse. We differ from the America of a century
ago in that we recognize how long it has been since moral and supernatural
sanctions united our culture, but we are more fragmented and less in concert
than in 1906.
Nonetheless, law cannot be neutral regarding justice. Courts cannot
shy away from the great controversies before them. But neither do they
serve the public when they artificially adjust public debate on fundamental
topics of morality. Pound reflects this tension regarding the "supremacy of
law."
By virtue of this doctrine, which has become
fundamental in our polity, the law restrains, not individuals
alone, but a whole people. The people so restrained would
be likely in any event to be jealous of the visible agents of
restraint. Even more is this true in that the subjects which
our constitutional polity commits to the courts are largely
matters of economics, politics, and sociology upon which a
democracy is peculiarly sensitive. Not only are these matters
made into legal questions, but they are tried as incidents of
private litigation.
17
When courts are entangled in these political questions, neither the
judiciary nor the public is benefited. The modern parlance of "judicial
activism" tries to invoke this same criticism, that judges do not benefit the
parties or society when they accept the invitation of private litigants to
legislate from the bench. But judicial restraint has no ideology; it applies
equally to judicial attempts to commune with the inner thoughts of the
founding founders 18 as it does to the appearance of Christmas Trees in
15 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
16 See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2005).
17 Pound, supra note 3, at 282-83.
18 E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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municipal buildings, 19 the appellations "San" and "Santa" from all
municipalities or religious iconography in city seals. 20
Third, Pound recognized that the corollary of judicial legislating is
the desire by politicians to control the courts. "Putting courts into politics
and compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions, has
almost destroyed the traditional respect for the Bench.' Not only have
judicial elections continued as part of our political landscape, but Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White 22 now expands this role by enabling candidates
23to take political positions,  as well as allowing party endorsement and direct
financial solicitation.24 Through these cases, the Minnesota Republican Party
and others successfully sued to remove the prohibition on judicial candidates
from taking public positions on issues that might come before the court.
25
Indeed, it would be ironic if consequences were not so troubling.
The present Court has lost heed of Pound's seminal voice, interjecting both
politics into the judiciary and the judiciary into politics. 26 The Supreme
Court even noted that Minnesota's judicial elections changed from partisan
to nonpartisan in 1912,27 shortly after Pound made his call for change.
Without heeding Pound's voice of concern, the Supreme Court returned to
the status which existed prior to Pound's seminal call for change.
Finally, Pound decried "the making the legal profession into a trade,
which has superseded the relation of attorney and client by that of employer
and employee. 28 What does it suggest that Pound chastised the American
Bar Association for this failure one hundred years ago? Perhaps the ideals
for which we strive have always been aspirations, standards that were never
really met by the generations before us. But if we are struggling to merely
approach these standards, then how much more damage will be caused by the
19 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 616
(1989) ("The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol. Although
Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they typify the secular celebration
of Christmas.").
20 A variety of challenges have been made to religious endorsement. I do not
believe "St." has been challenged in the name of the Minnesota state capital. E.g., Friedman
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (county seal);
Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (cross in city seal); Harris v. City
of Zion, Lake County, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991) (cross in city seal). Cf. King v.
Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11 th Cir. 2003) (Ten Commandments acceptable in
seal when not legible).
21 Pound, supra note 3, at 290
22 536 U.S. 765 (2004).
23 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 788 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, Dimick v. Republican Party of Minn., 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
24 Id.
25 The so-called "announce clause" provided that candidate for a judicial office,
including an incumbent judge, shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues. Id. at 758.26 Cf Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
27 Republican Party of Minn., 416 F.3d at 768.
28 Pound, supra note 3, at 273.
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gargantuan size of some law firms, the global trade in legal services, and the
erosion of the attorney-client relationship? The economics of law does not
bode well to reverse this trend. The cost of legal education continues to rise,
the access to affordable legal representation for the middle class continues to
decline, and the public is turning to software packages for tax, estate
planning, and other legal services.
Moreover, technology creates an imperative to provide instant
answers to clients. The communication speeds have accelerated at the pace
of Moore's law, transitioning from mail delivery to fax machines, to e-mails,
to instant messages. Constant, real-time communication with clients cannot
allow for careful review of the advice provided. Virtual private networks
tying lawyers and clients into shared computer networks reshape the
relationship between lawyer and client without the opportunity to engage in a
reflective or structured analysis of what this relationship should mean to
professional obligations, the lawyer's independence, or the client's needs.
Nonetheless, it may be that the present landscape and the landscape
of the prior century look alike again, without assuming that there has been no
change. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, state accreditation
standards, a high quality of legal education throughout virtually all the ABA-
approved law schools, a national Inns of Court network and many other
efforts have been made to improve the profession or incorporate
professionalism into the new landscape before us.
Perhaps the next challenge will be to assure that the ideals of
professionalism and an embrace for the lawyer's relationship with the client
are inculcated into the technological innovation and globalization.
Lawyering will not look the same one hundred years hence, but we can work
to assure that the canons of ethics are included in the interactions with lawyer
and client regardless of the speed with which they take place or where the
lawyers are situated. Lawyers in India or China working on U.S. client
matters should not only be held to the U.S. professional standards, but also
given the concomitant level of training on these ethics and the obligations
they impose.
It could require that we move another step beyond what is accepted
today. For example, we hold ourselves to a value of pro bono publico, or
"for the public good." The Latin does not require that the good works be
voluntary, and a voluntary obligation may some day be insufficient to meet
our obligation to serve the public good. If we lawyers were compelled to
provide mandatory pro bono, would the profession romanticize the start of
the twenty-first century as better because the service was voluntary or will
our successors view us as unenlightened because we valued our autonomy
more than our duty?
The only valid prediction I can make is that the nature of the debate
on our profession being held in 2056 is beyond my contemplation. I am
reminded, however, of the biblical passages in Deuteronomy. God first
describes a nation in which there will be no needy among the Jewish
[Vol. 30:3
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people, 29 and yet within the same chapter states "the poor shall never cease
out of the land; therefore... open thy hand unto thy poor and needy brother,
in thy land.""' 30 In the same way, I look forward to a day when lawyers are
not necessary because men have indeed become angels. I hope for a day
when our voluntary adherence to our professional ideals creates an excess of
legal services for the public. And I have sufficient confidence in the quality
of our profession and the members who will join us in the next century, so I
do not fear for our ability to meet the challenges set forth by Pound to
improve the profession.
At the half-way point in the centenary, Pound, then Dean Emeritus
of Harvard Law School, tracked the transformation in the law, making "the
careful distinction between Law and laws. Says he: 'The vital, the enduring
part of the law is in principles - starting points for reasoning - not in rules.
Principles remain relatively constant or develop along constant lines. Rules
have relatively short lives. They do not develop; they are repealed and are
superseded by other rules."'
3 1
The principles identified by Pound have endured. As well illustrated
by the articles in this volume, his emphasis on the elimination of the sport of
arcane procedure led to the adoption of the modem Rules of Civil Procedure,
the professional code of ethics, and leadership in legal education at Harvard
that have served to shape the modem legal landscape. Despite suggestions
incorporated in this volume, a public advocate should not place his or her
clients or the courts into service merely to achieve the lawyer's professed
agenda.32 We are servant leaders who owe a duty to further our client's
needs. Pound would have decried the notion that lawyers use the prosecution
of legal claims to further the lawyer's public agenda.
Similarly, Pound would likely have rejected the notion that we need
"schools of justice" rather than "schools of law" as suggested by Professor
Peter L. Davis.3 3 Such a prediction is based, in part, on Dean Pound's
profound impact on the shape of modem legal education from his vantage as
Harvard's dean. As Pound predicted the improvement in justice, "our courts
will be swift and certain agents of justice, whose decisions will be
acquiesced in and respected by all."34  Dean Floyd points this out by
qualifying her thoughtful analysis: "I am not arguing for ad hoc substitution
of individual ethics for law. History is replete with examples of the harm
29 "[T]here shall be no needy among you - for the Lord will surely bless thee in
the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it - if only thou
diligently hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all this commandment
which I command thee this day." Deuteronomy 15:4-5 (Jewish Pub. Soc. 1917).
30 Deuteronomy 15:11 (Jewish Pub. Soc. 1917) (internal quotations omitted).
31 The Work of Justice, supra note 1.
32 But see Deborah J. Cantrell, Sensational Reports: The Ethical Duty of Cause
Lawyers to be Competent in Public Advocacy, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 567 (2007).
33 See Peter L. Davis, Why Not a Justice School? On the Role of Justice in Legal
Education and the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 513 (2007).
34 Pound, supra note 3, at 291.
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that such an approach can cause, and I agree with Pound that the law
appropriately represents communal values developed over many years. 35
This is not to suggest that justice is not the ultimate ideal to be
pursued. But such a principle is about the fairness and impartiality of
decisions, the legitimacy of the judiciary and the refusal to subvert the most
accurate outcome of a matter regardless of the plight of the parties.36
This justice is taught throughout every aspect of legal education.
Translating justice into notions of social equity and fairness are goals Pound
feared and resisted because these changes are precisely the mercurial laws
that change with the political wind and should be avoided.37 Does legal
education undermine these ideal? Dean Floyd raises the question well.
"Perhaps in our zeal to teach lawyers impartiality and fairness, however, we
have gone too far and have instead taught that individual moral and ethical
values are always irrelevant to one's work as a lawyer or jurist. '38 Neither
Pound's words nor his legacy would encourage us to lose sight of our
communal moral and ethical values. From the range of ideas incorporated
into this symposium issue, we may be able to build upon those normative
values and be better informed by using the framework Pound created when
he mounted the steps of the St. Paul capitol building.
Pound's societal challenges remain before us. We must continue to
educate the public regarding the value of the judiciary as an independent
branch of government, holding it accountable based on its integrity and not
by political standards of the day. We can, however, hold it responsible if its
members dally with politics and threaten its independence. We must guard
against the ever-increasing trend to sensationalize what occurs by journalists.
Interestingly, this may mean providing greater access to the public so that the
courts can reduce the reliance on reporters to serve as mediators of the
activities of the court. However this is achieved, the public can only be
served by accurate and complete information about the ongoing activities of
the courts rather than the fictionalized or sensationalized versions more
commonly presented.
Finally, we must empower the courts to say no to those cases which
strain the fabric of society under the shield of private dispute. Again, we can
achieve this result only through education. If both sides to a debate
recognize that any judicial opinion will serve to distract from the underlying
social issue, perhaps the parties will realize that the courts are not the venue
in which to spend resources. Pyrrhic victories are expensive and distracting.
35 Floyd, supra note 8, at 559.
36 See Deuteronomy 16:18-20. "You shall not judge unfairly: you shall show no
partiality; you shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the discerning and upset the
plea of the just. Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land that
Adonai your God is giving you." Id.
37 The Work of Justice, supra note 2.
38 Floyd, supra note 8, at 559.
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Like Pound, I have confidence in our legal education and our
citizens to believe that the values of the judiciary and the profession will
continue to flourish, despite the many challenges. I second his wish that "we
may look forward to a near future when our courts will be swift and certain
agents of justice, whose decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by
all."39
39 Pound, supra note 3, at 291.
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